We study the spatiotemporal correlation of terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda, ISIS, and local insurgents, in six geographical areas identified via k-means clustering applied to the Global Terrorism Database.
T errorist activities by al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have brought violence and destruction to the Middle East and the world (1) . Many historical, political, religious motivations lie behind this unrest and several complementary perspectives have been offered to explain it (2) (3) (4) (5) . Recent advances in data collection have allowed for the thorough updating of terrorist databases; being able to extract information from them may help gain new insight and yield novel counterterrorism opportunities.
This work examines the spatiotemporal correlation of terrorist attacks perpetrated worldwide by AQ and ISIS, focusing on the post-2014 era, when they began functioning as independent entities. On the local scale, the AQ/ISIS dynamics may be affected by independent militias or insurgents acting as rivals or allies to either. These groups are often entrenched in their communities and may be quite powerful, even eclipsing AQ or ISIS. Using near-repeat analysis (6-11) on data derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), we analyze patterns of attack for three classes of terror groups (AQ, ISIS and local militias) in six geographical clusters. The latter are identified through k-means clustering without imposing any a priori geographical constraints, such as national borders. The constituency of each class varies across clusters: AQ or ISIS may have the most combatants in some, in others, local militias may be the most numerous. Despite cluster heterogeneity, our findings indicate universal near-repeat activity, whereby an attack by a given group temporarily raises the probability of further attacks by the same one within 20km over 4-10 weeks. The variability depends on location and organization, but groups with fewer combatants are always found to display the longest period of enhanced near-repeat. While insurgents are present in all clusters, AQ and ISIS may or may not be; where they do co-localize, one is numerically superior to the other and in conflict with insurgents. The two most numerous groups (insurgents and either AQ or ISIS) are regarded as major players; the minor, numerically inferior one between AQ/ISIS, aligns with either of the major two. We also examine patterns of responding near-repeat, in short near-reaction, whereby an attack by a given group elicits a response from a different one. Insurgent activity intensifies after an attack by a major rival (either AQ/ISIS) while the latter suppresses its activity following insurgent attacks, leading to an asymmetric dynamic. Aligned groups, allies or neutral parties united against a common enemy, reinforce each other's activities so that regardless of which one strikes first, the other will always intensify its attacks within 20km. No evidence of outbidding is found, whereas terrorist activity increases in response to government action in all surveyed clusters. Our findings underline the importance of local geography and hierarchies in understanding terrorism. , a centralized group aiming to occupy the northern Iraqi territories by the Syrian border. As the Syrian civil war intensified in 2013, ISI became ISIS and expanded into Syria without consulting AQ's general command, creating tension with Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), a Syrian AQ affiliate. After repeated attempts to control its expansion, AQ disavowed ISIS on Feb 2 2014. In the years since, AQ continued fostering local collaborations, including with al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, while ISIS expanded beyond its Iraq/Syria base to control remote territories in Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given their more adversarial nature and efficient media usage, counterterror efforts focused on constraining ISIS, leading to concerns of indirectly strengthening AQ (13) . Since imbalanced intervention may be ineffective (14) , better understanding the interplay among groups may lead to strategies that do not inadvertently bolster any of them.
D R A F T

Materials and Methods
We examine the terrorist activities of AQ, ISIS and local groups as listed by the GTD which catalogued global terrorist attacks between Jan 1 1970 and Dec 31 2017 (15) . We mostly focus on the post-2014 era, when AQ disavowed ISIS.
Data selection. The GTD lists a maximum of three confirmed or suspect perpetrator groups per attack. We discard entries with unknown offenders (46% of the total). If at least one of the perpetrators is an AQ affiliate, the record is assigned to AQ; similarly for ISIS. If AQ and ISIS are responsible for the same attack, it is assigned to both. Finally, if neither is listed as the perpetrator, the record is assigned to the L class (local militias/insurgents). Affiliates were added to the AQ/ISIS classes only after their formal acceptance; since during 2004-2014 ISIS predecessors were recognized as AQ affiliates, their attacks within this period are assigned to both the AQ and ISIS classes. Full affiliate AQ/ISIS lists are in the SI Appendix.
Cluster analysis. To examine the spatiotemporal distribution of AQ/ISIS attacks we first identify geographic areas where they co-localize using k-means clustering (16) . The sole input here is attack location; no other constraints, such as state borders, are used (SI Appendix). We identify twelve clusters and determine the geographic centers and standard deviations (STD) of each. As shown in Figs. 1(a)-(b) clusters are found to mostly coincide with geo-political boundaries, due to increased border security, attacks occurring in civic centers in the interior, or terrorist familiarity with terrain/culture. In some cases we observe spill-over or domino effects, due to weak borders or historical/political precedents (17) . The Afghan-Pakistan cluster arises due to militant groups residing between the two countries; the Syria cluster is found to include Lebanon due the Syrian civil war spilling over to its neighbor; the Nigeria cluster includes small portions of neighboring Chad, Cameroon and Niger, as Boko Haram attempted to evade government scrutiny; since AQ affiliated al-Shabaab often launched attacks from Somalia into neighboring Kenya the two form a unique cluster. Specific geographical conditions may thus allow terrorism to spread across borders. To add an L class attack to one of the clusters identified above we calculate its distance from the center of the nearest AQ/ISIS cluster; if the distance is within three STDs from its center, the L class attack is assigned to this cluster, else it is discarded. The resulting distribution is shown in Fig 1(c) . The six clusters containing enough events to justify further analysis are listed in Table 1 . We focus on them in the remainder of this work. Major and minor groups are labeled on the basis of their estimated number of combatants. The two major groups in Syria and Yemen are known rivals.
Near-repeat analysis. Terrorist events within each cluster are examined using near-repeat analysis tools developed in criminology (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) . Near-repetition within the "fixed window" method is quantified by comparing the distribution of given data to a hypothetical distribution of random, independent events (9, 10) . This is done by partitioning the given timespan into several windows of time w; within each window the time difference 0 < t < w and the spatial distance between every pair of events are calculated. The time distribution for events occurring within a a maximum distance d are subsequently compiled from all windows. This data-derived distribution is then compared to the random-event hypothesis (REH)
.
Eq. 1 is the random probability distribution for finding a pair of events separated by a time interval t within w, assuming events are uniformly distributed. For example, if w = 7 days, the probability of two events being separated by t = 1 day is proportional to the number of pairs separated by one day in one week: Mon-Tue, Tue-Wed through Sat-Sun, for a total of six possibilities. Conversely, there is only one possible pair of events separated by t = 6 days, Mon-Sun. P d (t) is thus proportional to w − t; the normalization prefactor 2/w(w − 1) in Eq. 1 ensures that w t=1 P d (t) = 1. Deviations from P d (t) indicate a non-random likelihood for an event to repeat after a prescribed time t. Contrasting observed distributions to P d (t) is equivalent to performing a Knox ratio analysis (11, 18, 19) . However, the latter requires sampling and Monte Carlo simulations to generate a randomized distribution for data comparison. Eq. 1 requires fewer assumptions and eliminates the need for simulations. We set w = 44 weeks, guaranteeing all near-repeat effects are captured. Feb 2 2014, the official AQ/ISIS rift date, is used as a starting point from which successive windows of w periods are generated. To verify whether any biases were introduced, different w values and start dates were used; results remained essentially unchanged. Same-day attacks are discarded, as it is not possible to determine whether they are part of a coordinated campaign or independent events (20) .
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Government intervention.
Since government (G) activity is not part of the GTD, we utilize the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dyadic dataset (21) to obtain lists of state-sponsored counterterrorism events. These are then cross-listed with ter-rorist attacks from the GTD to study terrorist/counterterrorist interplay. Sufficient data exists only for Iraq, Somalia and the Afghan-Pakistan clusters where government activities were targeted at ISIS, AQ and the Taliban, respectively. We use post-2014 data for Iraq, post-2012 data for Somalia, when al-Shabaab joined AQ and the Federal Government of Somalia was established, and post-2003 data for the Afghan-Pakistan cluster, when the Taliban launched large scale insurgencies against the Afghan government. There is not enough UCDP data for Nigeria or Syria (22) ; it is not possible to identify a legitimate government in Yemen due to the ongoing civil war.
Results
Al-Qaeda and ISIS activities. Terrorist attacks executed by AQ and ISIS between 2001-2017 are shown in Fig. 2(a) . Until 2011, AQ contributed to less than 5% of global activity, the ISIS precursors even less. In 2012, AQ's activities increased to roughly 10% of world total, mostly fueled by ISIS and al-Shabaab as shown in Fig. 2(b) . After the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift the percent of attacks by AQ proper stagnated, while ISIS's activity grew rapidly, surpassing AQ to reach almost 20% of world total in 2017. Fig. 2 (c) shows that this increase is due to greater activity of ISIS proper, but also to the emergence of affiliate terrorist groups. AQ's activities post-2014 are mostly due to al-Shabaab in Somalia. The distribution of terrorist attacks within the twelve geographical clusters identified in Fig. 3 (a). In Iraq, AQ attacks mostly cease after the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift while concurrent AQ/ISIS activities persist in Syria and Yemen as also shown in the time-resolved plot in SI Appendix Fig. S2 . AQ is mostly absent in Nigeria, Libya, and the Philippines; ISIS is inactive in Somalia and in the U.S. We also observe ISIS spreading from its Iraq base to neighboring countries through the terror "wave" in Fig. 3(b) . Here, the date of ISIS's first attack in each cluster is plotted as a function of its distance from Iraq. The progressive spread of ISIS activities also emerges from SI Appendix Fig. S3 , where attacks are geo-spatially mapped over time. These findings are consistent with ISIS's focus on expansion while AQ's activities vary in a more random manner, consistent with its decentralized "dune"-like structure.
Near-repeat activity. Near-repeat results are shown in Fig. 3 (c) where we plot the latent time t between every pair of AQ after AQ (i.e., AQ→AQ) or ISIS after ISIS (i.e., ISIS→ISIS) attacks separated by less than 20km or more than 100km, worldwide and post-2014. For comparison the REH distribution in Eq. 1 is also shown. We use the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD, SI Appendix) to quantify the deviation of attack distributions from the REH. Fig. 3 (c1) shows that during the first 4 weeks after an AQ attack, the probability for a near-repeat attack within 20km is elevated with respect to the REH. ISIS exhibits an even longer period of elevated near-repeat probability within 20km: 10 weeks, as shown in Fig. 3 (c2). At distances beyond 100km, near-repeat effects are negligible and the latent time distributions converge to the REH, as seen in Figs. 3(c3)-(c4). Henceforth, we use 20km as the maximal distance for nearrepeat events. Only six of the twelve clusters identified in Fig. 1 contain enough data for near-repeat analysis. Fig. 4 Near-reaction activity. To analyze the post-2014 interplay among AQ, ISIS and the L groups in each cluster we consider the latent time distribution for A→B events where a class A attack is followed by a class B attack within 20km for {A,B} = {AQ, ISIS, L} and A = B. We do not expect symmetry between the A→B and B→A panels as power structures may be imbalanced. We omit Somalia, with no significant ISIS or L presence, and Nigeria where attacks by ISIS (Boko Haram) and L-class Fulani extremists display negligible overlap within 20km. Fig. 4 (b) shows data deviating significantly from the REH in all clusters indicating enhanced or hindered nearreaction. To interpret these results and determine whether the order in which the A,B classes strike and respond is relevant, we calculate the Shannon entropy contribution Ei for each of the A→B and B→A datasets in Fig. 4 Table 1 indicates that in all cases the two above classes are also the largest in their clusters. Our finding of a negative correlation suggests that an L-class group responds promptly to an attack by AQ/ISIS while the latter's response is delayed. If a third class is present, it is always the minor player listed in Table 1 and either collaborates (such as AQ and L-class rebels in Syria) or shares a similar ideology (such as AQ and ISIS in Yemen) with either of the two major ones. Fig. 4 (b) shows that the minor party always correlates positively with the major player it aligns with. Correlations between the minor group and the other major player are not significant indicating that the major player neglects its smaller adversary to focus on its main rival. These findings are consistent across surveyed clusters, and emerge for pre-2014 data as well (SI Appendix). In Somalia similar trends arise with enhanced AQ activity after G intervention (4 weeks); G also increases its activity in response to AQ (4 weeks). (c3) In the Afghan-Pakistan cluster near-reaction is enhanced in the G → L (4 weeks) and L → G (6 weeks) panels where L is the Taliban. Although data is limited, we observe a delayed response from ISIS and an asymmetric G → ISIS and ISIS → G dynamic with r = −0.56, typical of near-repeat patterns involving transnational groups. Events separated by more than 100km follow the REH. Panels with less than 100 data points are not analyzed due to insufficient data. The L classes are as listed in Table 1 .
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Government intervention.
We examine terrorist/state interplay in the Iraq, Somalia and Afghan-Pakistan clusters in Figs. 4(c1)-(c3). In Iraq, the post-2014 G (UCDP data) → ISIS (GTD data) and ISIS → G near-reaction panels show both parties displaying enhanced near-response within 20km over several months. There is no data for government action explicitly aimed at the L-class in Iraq, however we can examine whether government operations directed at ISIS indirectly affect L-class activities. Thus, in Fig. 4 (c1) we also study G → L (GTD data) near-reaction activity. L responses spike for 2 weeks after G action, most likely as a short-lived immediate reaction to any nearby event, regardless of intended targets. No clear L → G trends emerge, implying that government activity aimed at ISIS is not influenced by prior L-class activities. Similar trends are observed for the G → AQ and AQ → G post-2012 panels in Fig. 4(c2) for Somalia, where no L-class group is present, and in the G → L and L → G post-2003 panels in Fig. 4(c3) for the Afghan-Pakistan cluster (L here is the Taliban). We also include near-reaction between the small ISIS group present in the Afghan-Pakistan cluster and government interventions aimed at the Taliban. Despite the small sample size of the ISIS attacks, the asymmetry between the G → ISIS and ISIS → G panels in Fig. 4(c3) , is in agreement with earlier observations of delayed responses by global groups. Large correlation values in all clusters indicate strong interplay between terrorist/state actors, each aiming to signal their own supremacy. Except for Somalia, state operations persist slightly longer than terrorist activity.
Discussion
Near-repeat patterns, often observed in urban crime, also emerge for terrorist attacks by AQ, ISIS and mostly all other contemporary insurgent groups, despite heterogeneous local conditions. The corresponding spatiotemporal scales (20km and 4-10 weeks) are larger than for urban crime, where effects persist over a few hundred meters for 2-6 weeks (6, 9, 10) . This may be due to terror attacks being more impactful in terms of damage, media coverage, psychological effects; longer times may also be required to orchestrate repeat events. Spatial clustering reveals territorial effects. For example, AQ displays a longer period of elevated near-repeat than ISIS in Syria, but the trend is reversed in Yemen. In both cases, the minor organization exhibits more prominent near-repeat activity than the major one, a consistent finding in this work. Why?
We note that numerically inferior groups may need to act more frequently to maintain visibility, especially in the presence of more established organizations. This is in agreement with game-theoretic studies whereby sustained violence allows small groups of radicals to stay relevant and grow (23) . Nearreaction patterns between major rivals in the same cluster
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show asymmetric behavior. Typically, one of the two global terrorist organizations (AQ or ISIS) is in conflict with local militias/insurgents which respond promptly to AQ or ISIS attacks. Conversely, the response of the global terror group is delayed in time. This asymmetric behavior may be due to local militias having the agility and need to respond quickly, whereas global terror groups may require longer decisional times. The remaining group, typically with the least number of combatants, tends to align itself with one of the major ones, executing copy-cat or supportive attacks. These aligned parties may be engaged in a leader-follower relationship, the minor party may be a supportive ally of the major one, or the two may be neutral, non-hostile entities united by the same ideology or intent against the same rival. The trend is consistent with social balance theory which posits that in a triadic relationship where two entities are already in conflict, the only balanced position the third can adopt is to align itself with one and oppose the other (24) . Recent studies on urban gangs confirm similar dynamics (25) . This triadic pattern is manifest in Syria, where post-2014, AQ affiliate JN began supporting the L-class antigovernment rebels, leading to ISIS→L rivalry/negative (r/n) correlation, AQ →L aligned/positive (a/p) correlation, and weak AQ →ISIS correlation. In Yemen, AQ affiliate AQAP has been a longtime opponent to local insurgents whereas ISIS established its provinces here in 2015. AQ and ISIS are rivals but both regard insurgent groups as their primary enemies, leading to AQ →L r/n correlation, AQ 
Conclusion
We studied the spatiotemporal patterns of terrorist attacks by AQ, ISIS and local militias/insurgents by applying datadriven, unsupervised k-means clustering to the GTD. While near-repeat/reaction patterns are observed in all clusters (29) (30) (31) , the accompanying variations highlight the territorial aspects of terrorism (32) and the role played by local hierarchies, even when global terrorist groups are present. Near-repeat duration, inter-group dynamics and government response depend more on a group's relative size and on its local relation to other groups than on whether or not it is part of a transnational organization. Understanding the local aspects of terrorism may help policy-makers better plan timing, permanence, and expectations of anti-terrorism intervention. Our correlative observations can help shape statistically optimal resource allocation and logistics to more efficiently respond to future attacks. Possible extensions could include constructing poly-order chains of events to distinguish attack methods and weapon/target types to further refine the understanding of repeat activity and the design of response protocols (33, 34).
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Supplementary Information Local alliances and rivalries shape near-repeat terror activity of al-Qaeda, ISIS and insurgents
Supporting Information Text
AQ and ISIS affiliates, and L-class groups in the GTD
The ISIS class consists of ISIS proper (5676 attacks), its predecessors, and its various remote provinces or chapters. 
L-class local militias/insurgent groups.
To analyze the interplay between AQ, ISIS and local militias/insurgent groups that define the L class, we identified areas where attacks from the L class co-localize with the twelve AQ/ISIS clusters identified above. We identify 38220 worldwide L-class attacks between 2001-2017, of which 19116 are post-2014. Of these, 13551 co-localize with the AQ/ISIS clusters. Here we list the names of local groups which contributed more than 20 attacks in the respective clusters post-2014: 
k-means clustering analysis
We examined the spatial distribution of attacks in the AQ and ISIS classes defined above through geographic clustering. We used the k-means algorithm which assigns each event, in this case an AQ or ISIS attack, to one of k clusters by iteratively updating the centers of these clusters and minimizing the root-mean-square distanced k between the event location and its assigned cluster center (1) . The number of clusters k is a prescribed parameter for the algorithm;d k decreases as k increases, as shown in Fig. S1(a) , and is exactly zero when k equals the total number of events, since in this case the location of each event becomes its own cluster center. Although the goal of minimizingd k favors the choice of a large k, decreases ind k as k increases may become negligible beyond a threshold value k * , indicating that new clusters are not distinguishable from old ones. The optimal k * is often determined by plottingd k as a function of k and identifying the value of k beyond which it begins to plateau. Fig. S1 (b) illustrates how we quantitatively identify k * . We first define I k ≡ |d k+1 −d k |/d k as the relative change ind k as the number of clusters is increased from k to k + 1 and plot I k versus k. We find that I k decreases from about 10% to about 5% when k increases from 12 to 13 and stays well below 10% as k further increases. We thus set k * = 12 as the optimal number of clusters. When k = 13, the Somalia cluster is split in two due to its elongated geographic shape; since all attacks in Somalia have been attributed to AQ-affiliated al-Shabaab, the cluster should be unique, confirming that k * = 12 is the optimal k value. We set a threshold of at least 100 post-2014 data points per cluster to justify further analysis. According to this definition, among the twelve identified above only six contain enough data to be used for our near-repeat analysis. 10% to 5%; we thus identify k * = 12 as the optimal number of clusters.
They are Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Nigeria, and Afghan-Pakistan. Of the others, five clusters have too few attacks for any statistically significant analysis; they are Mali, Algeria/E.U., Bangladesh, the Philippines, and the U.S. The Libya cluster has relatively more data points than the previous five, but the attacks are sparsely distributed on a vast area, yielding an insufficient number of closely separated pairs for us to analyze. As seen in Fig. 1 of the main text, the twelve clusters are roughly limited by geo-political boundaries and few attacks occur near the borders; this allows us to name each cluster by the country where the majority of attacks took place. It is important to note that our k-means clustering uses only attack-location as input and that we did not pre-impose that clusters be limited by national borders, rather their geographic extent emerged naturally. To verify the robustness of our clustering, we varied the random number sequence of the k-means algorithm seeding the initial cluster centroids, and found that the spatial extent of the clusters remained consistent across runs. While most clusters coincide with a single country, a few contain parts of a neighboring one due to porous frontiers, or shared political and/or historical traits, showing that diffusion of terrorism across boundaries may be possible under specific geographical conditions (2) . For example, Lebanon is clustered with Syria due to spill over-effects of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon facilitated by fluid boundaries between the two. Similarly, since AQ used Somalia as a base to launch attacks against Kenya, the two are part of the same cluster. The Nigeria cluster includes a small area between neighboring Chad, Niger and Cameroon where occasionally Boko Haram has spilled over due to border porosity. Afghanistan and Pakistan are in the same cluster due to militant groups residing in the tribal corridor between the two, particularly in North and South Waziristan: the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Khorasan Chapter of ISIS. Finally, attacks in Algeria, Tunisia and the E.U. coalesce into one cluster due to the small, uncoordinated, number of attacks on European soil and in Tunisia which are geographically closest to the denser ones in Algeria. For the most part however attacks are mostly confined within nation states. This may be due to increased military security at the border, or because borders coincide with natural barriers such as mountain ranges, deserts or rivers where terrorist events would cause fewer victims, elicit less interest from the press, and garner less attention from the population. Another possible reason is that terror groups prioritize attacks on "soft" targets where large numbers of civilians aggregate and these are mostly located in major cities, typically in the interior. Furthermore, terrorists may prefer to act in familiar settings, responding to local sources of discontent and grievances (3) (4) (5) . Also note that while AQ and ISIS both aim for the supremacy of Islamic values, they also establish themselves in territories with pre-existing militant groups that carry different sources of discontent, instabilities, antipathies, that have existed for much longer periods than the advent of either, so that regionality is to be expected on some level. Finally, AQ is flexible and operates as a geographically diffused network of semi-autonomous cells, allowing for regionality to emerge by design. ISIS is more centralized, yet as it conquered or accepted groups that pledged allegiance to it, it divided its territory into provinces, factoring in pre-existing conflicts and geographical constraints. Indeed, the provinces often coincide with the countries (or subnational units) they are based in. So although AQ and ISIS are transnational groups, their activities on the ground are tied to the local discourse and remain clustered mostly in well defined areas. This is also verified by the location of attacks and origin of their perpetrator groups being always in the same cluster, except for a handful of exceptions. For example, the Nusra Front and the Free Syrian Armies concentrated all of their attacks in the Syria cluster, al-Shabaab stays confined to the Somalia cluster, Boko Haram's sphere of action is the Nigeria cluster. Finally, note that we investigated possible near-reaction activities over 20km and at the borders between Syria-Lebanon, Somalia-Kenya, Afghanistan-Pakistan, and across the countries that comprise the Nigeria cluster, and found scant data due to violent attacks being executed near major cities as described earlier. Fig. S3 shows AQ and ISIS activities within each cluster as a function of time by binning terrorist incidents in six month intervals starting from 2012. What emerges is that AQ attacks mostly cease in Iraq after it disavowed ISIS in 2014. Significant AQ/ISIS overlap is observed in Syria and Yemen. In Syria, this overlap is due to ISIS expanding into the country in 2013, right before the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift (6) . In Yemen, it is due to the establishment of a new ISIS province in 2015. The twelve panels are arranged in increasing order of distance from Iraq. The first data points for ISIS emerge at later times in the lower panels, geographically further from Iraq, revealing a spreading terror "wave" for ISIS. A complementary visualization is offered in Fig. 3(b) of the main text, as well as in right panels of Fig. S4 , where attacks are geo-spatially mapped every six months beginning in 2012. AQ activities in contrast manifest more random spatiotemporal variation, as can be seen from the left panels of Fig. S4 . The different spatio-temporal patterns characterizing AQ and ISIS may be a reflection of their different organizational structures, as AQ may be described as a decentralized "dune-like" network of various cells, while ISIS follows a centralized hierarchy. These structural differences are related to their distinct goals and approaches (7) . AQ's priority is to eliminate Western influence from the Middle East; terrorist attacks are tools to weaken their perceived oppressors. ISIS's preferred action is to expand the territories it controls, attacking unfriendly communities and non-Sunni Muslims. As a result AQ has developed a large decentralized network of collaborative relationships including with the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with al-Shabaab in Somalia, and with Boko Haram in Nigeria. In these regions AQ rarely operates on its own, but provides logistic and financial support to local groups, largely without friction. Very few attacks can thus be directly attributed to AQ, and they are not enough to be statistically analyzed. Conversely ISIS's strategy has long been to either subordinate existing groups, as attempted with Boko Haram in Nigeria, or to establish its own terrorist province antagonizing local groups, as done in Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
AQ and ISIS in the context of global terror
Temporal overlap of AQ and ISIS activities in each cluster
The Kullback-Leibler Divergence and the near-repeat 20 km threshold
Converting geographic coordinates to distances. For near-repeat analysis, we need to first compute the distance between pairs of GTD events, which are recorded as longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates (xi, yi) for all i entries. By approximating the Earth as a perfect sphere, as illustrated in Fig. S5 , we determine the distance L between two events as follows
where the radius of the Earth is R Earth = 6373 km and where the radiant angle between the two events is given by
The length of the segment s between the two events that appears in Eq. 2 is given by
where xi represents longitude and yi represents latitude for the i = 1, 2 locations. The Kullback-Leibler divergence. We then utilize the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) to quantify discrepancies between the observed near-repeat latent time distribution and the random event hypothesis (REH) distribution given by P d (t) in Eq. 1 of the main text for pairs of events separated by a distance L ≤ d. The KLD is defined as the Shannon entropy of the data
ISIS attack distributions
In Eq. 4 Ei =pi ln(pi/pi) is the i th data point contribution to the KLD, which quantifies how muchpi deviates from pi. The prefactorpi places greater weight on events of higher probability and reduces the contribution of fluctuations associated to rare events. The KLD values depend on d, the maximum distance between two events for which the time lag ti can be calculated.
In Fig. S6 we plot the KLD as a function of d for AQ→AQ and ISIS→ISIS near-repeat events post-2014. There are 204 weeks between Feb 2, 2014, the official AQ/ISIS rift date, and Dec 31, 2017, the last GTD entry. We calculate the KLD on a sample of four consecutive w = 44 week windows within the above time frame, and repeat the same procedure ten times by randomly changing the start date beyond Feb 2, 2014. The average KLD value and the error bars shown in Fig. S6 are obtained over the effective 40 samples of duration w. For both AQ and ISIS, the KLD decreases as d increases, indicating that the near-repeat tendency is stronger for events geographically closer to each other, and that the latent time distribution converges to the REH y 1 y 2 when the underlying events are sufficiently far. In the main text we set d = 20km as the distance threshold within which to study near-repeat phenomena. This value of d is represented by the second point on each of the curves in Fig. S6 . The first point corresponds to a 10km threshold and has the largest KLD value but also the largest error due to the fewer pairs of near-repeat events that can be constructed under a smaller upper distance limit. When d = 20km instead, the KLD is large enough and the error small enough, to distinguish it from KLD values at greater distances, say at 100km.
We also find it statistically significant that for attacks within 20km ISIS expresses a relatively stronger near-repeat tendency compared to AQ, since ISIS has greater KLD values than AQ and the two data points reside outside their respective error ranges. As d increases, the KLD value of AQ decreases at a slower rate than ISIS, the gap between them closes, and for distances of several hundreds of kilometers the KLD value of AQ exceeds that of ISIS. This may suggest a certain long-range coordination of AQ attacks which may be facilitated by its global network structure. We verified that all results are robust to moderate changes in w and to start dates beyond Feb 2, 2014.
For near-reaction patterns, we compute the correlation r between the {E A→B i } and {E B→A i } datasets, derived respectively from the A→B and B→A panels in Fig. 5 of the main text, where {A,B} = {AQ, ISIS, L} and A = B. A positive r indicates heightened attack response probabilities for both the A and B class organizations in response to each other's attacks; this may be due to collaborative, aligned, or retaliatory copycat events, for example. Conversely a negative r implies that the attack likelihood of say, class A quickly increases in response to attacks by class B, whereas class B delays its response after attacks by class A. This asymmetry may be to to structural differences between the two classes, where for example class B requires more time to evaluate and organize response attacks to class A. One of the main findings from the main text is that when the three AQ, ISIS, and L classes are all present in a cluster, one of the transnational groups (AQ or ISIS) and the local L class emerge as major players, and are in conflict with each other. The remaining transnational group (ISIS or AQ) is instead a minor player and tends to align itself with either of the major ones. These dynamics are reflected in the post-2014 near-reaction patterns. Asymmetric A→B and B→A near-reaction activity, and a negative r are found to characterize rival organizations, where the agile, quick to respond A is the local militia/insurgent group and B the slower transnational organization (AQ/ISIS). Symmetric A→B and B→A near-reaction activity and a positive r is instead a hallmark of collaborative/aligned groups. As we shall describe below, results from pre-2014 data are consistent with the post-2014 analysis illustrated above and rival groups still manifest A→B and B→A near-reaction asymmetry. There is no distinction between AQ and ISIS in any geographical cluster pre-2014, because either they were either the same organization, or ISIS had not expanded into the region yet; as a result, no collaborative/aligned relations, and no symmetric A→B and B→A near-reaction patterns are identified. Small |r| indicates weak correlation; in this case the sign of r becomes irrelevant since the two classes are essentially not responding to each other. We use conventional criteria and assume that r ≥ 0.66 (r ≤ −0.66) indicates strong correlation (anti-correlation), |r| < 0.33 represents weak correlation, and 0.33 < r ≤ 0.66 (−0.33 > r ≥ −0.66) is indicative of intermediate correlation (anti-correlation).
Outbidding
Outbidding is the process of competitive escalation among two (or more) separate but related groups who operate in the same geographical area and who orchestrate increasingly violent attacks to outshine the other(s) (8, 9) . The underlying assumption is that greater violence shows greater commitment and/or capability and can help garner support from the population. This mechanism was first proposed in Bloom, 2004 to explain escalating suicide bombings in Palestine by Hamas and Fatah, vying to be championed by the citizenry. The First and Second Intifadas are sometimes cited as examples of this practice. Similar phenomena have been described in scenarios that include nationalist, left and right-wing political violence (10), or within ethnic conflicts (11) . At times, caveats have been included such that outbidding will emerge only if communities are supportive of suicide bombings, or if religiously or nationalistically motivated (12) . Other authors have questioned the principle of outbidding leading to escalation of suicide terrorism and, in general, of terrorist acts of any type. The curves indicate that a distance threshold of d = 20km provides the most distinguishable ranges of KLD values from those with thresholds larger than 100km. Overall the KLD decreases for both AQ and ISIS as d increases. At short distances, ISIS exhibits larger deviation from the REH than AQ, revealing relatively stronger near-repeat tendencies. At long distances, however, the ISIS data deviates from the REH less than the AQ data, suggesting possible long-distance coordination of AQ activities through its global network.
to 2004 was analyzed in (13) . Apart from Israel, little support is found for outbidding, leading the authors to warn of the dangers of overgeneralizing from a limited set of cases. Others yet have criticized describing even the conflict in Palestine as an outbidding process and have excluded it from occurring in Iraq, at least prior to the advent of ISIS (14, 15) . A frequent objection to outbidding as a way to bolster support from the local population is that if this were the case, there would be fewer attacks with unknown offenders as terror groups would better advertise their actions. For the GTD data we analyzed about 46% of the total number of relevant attacks was due to unknown perpetrators. We examined the possibility of competitive escalation between the major terrorist groups in each cluster where applicable. In particular we consider the Iraq and Syria clusters, where the major players are ISIS and the L class. Instead of filtering for the number of suicide attacks, we analyze near-reaction patterns filtering for the number of casualties, as data is more plentiful.
The first scenario considered, shown in Fig. S7 is that of general outbidding, where any type of attack is followed by a lethal attack from rival groups with at least one, two or three casualties. These panels are denoted as L → ISIS + (ISIS → L + ) where the presence of casualties is represented by the + sign. For comparison we also replot the L → ISIS (ISIS → L) panels from the main text. As can be seen, the duration of the near-reaction time window, and the general shape of the attack pair distribution does not change much when lethality is taken into account compared to when it is. The only trend that arises is the same observed in the L → ISIS (ISIS → L) panels: the more nimble L class will more swiftly respond to ISIS attacks, to generate more support or attention, while ISIS will delay its response. The same findings are found in the Syria shown in the right hand side of Figure S7 . Another possibility is that of an incremental outbidding scenario, where a lethal attack with X casualties is followed by another with at least Y > X casualties (L + → ISIS ++ ). Various choices for X,Y are shown in Fig. S8 ; however just as above no novel trend can be identified compared to the L → ISIS (ISIS → L) panels. We also considered mutually lethal outbidding, where any deadly attack is followed by any other deadly attack, L + → ISIS + . Finally, for Iraq we could also strictly select for suicide attacks, whereas this not possible in Syria due to insufficient data. No novel patterns were found in any of these cases. The same outcome emerged from pairing major and minor players in all other clusters.
Finally, we examined provoked outbidding where (B → A)→ B attack sequences are compared to general A → B sequences. In the (B → A) → B chain of events, B strikes first and the A response is constrained to be within 20km and 4 weeks, defining a first near-reaction response. We then take this subset of A attacks, which can be thought of as provoked by B, and study how the B class responds to them, defining a second near-reaction response. Our goal is to determine whether the second B near-reaction response in the (B → A) → B sequence differs from the general B response in the unprovoked A → B sequence. Indeed, if outbidding were at play, we would expect escalation to be manifest in B's response to provoked A attacks, (B → A)→ B, through larger deviations from the REH than B's response to general, unprovoked A attacks, A→ B.
Only the Iraq cluster contains sufficient data for a meaningful analysis. Among the 4575 post-2014 ISIS attacks here, 105 were provoked by L according to the criteria defined above; among the 996 L attacks, 151 were provoked by ISIS. Fig.4(c1) of the main text or by comparing the (G → ISIS) → G panel here with the ISIS → G panel in Fig.4(c1) of the main text.
as ISIS responds to provoked government operations, however the response is not noticeably different or stronger than ISIS responding to general G events, as can be seen in the G → ISIS panel Fig. 4(c1) of the main text. Both show elevated ISIS response likelihood within the first 4 months and the same degree of deviation from REH (KLD=0.014 in both provoked and unprovoked government operations). No outbidding is observed in the (G → ISIS) → G events either: G responds to ISIS retaliations indifferently, indicated by the near-REH latent time distribution. The same analysis is not possible for Syria due to lack of sufficient data.
Our work thus can be placed within the literature warning of the application of outbidding as a general theory: near-response and near-repeat trends do not seem to greatly change when escalation is included. Perhaps, apart from specific cases such as Palestine and its unique Hamas-Fatah rivalry, terrorist groups operate in the same way whether or not attacks involve casualties; whether casualties arise may also be largely out of their control. This is also confirmed by recent studies which explicitly exclude competitive escalation between AQ and ISIS (16) .
Government intervention
The interplay between counterterrorism efforts and terrorist attacks (17) is studied in the Iraq, Somalia and Afghan-Pakistan clusters, since they are the only ones where sufficient data is available. As mentioned in the main text, we utilize the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dyadic dataset (18) to do this. The data is collected from global media sources and listed in terms of dyads engaged in armed conflict; players may include state actors. A dyad is considered to be in conflict if both sides adopt incompatible positions that lead to more than 25 casualties within a year, in which case all related activities are recorded. We cross-list this data with terrorist events from the GTD to create near-reaction diagrams. In Iraq, between 2014-2017 the UCDP lists 2230 incidents involving the Iraqi government directed at ISIS; the GTD lists 4362 attacks for ISIS and 996 L-class events in the same time interval. For Somalia, we study the effects of counterterrorism activity between Feb 9, 2012, the day that al-Shabaab officially joined the AQ, and Dec 31, 2017. Coincidentally, the Federal Government of Somalia was established on August 20, 2012. The UCDP lists 1847 events by the Somali government against al-Shabaab while the GTD lists 2850 al-Shabaab attacks within the same timeframe. The Taliban government was overthrown from Afghanistan in 2001, following the US-led invasion that took place after the 9/11 attacks. For the Afghan-Pakistan cluster thus a natural timeframe for terrorist and counterterrorist near-reaction studies would be the post-2001 period. Note that the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift is unlikely to play a relevant role here since the Taliban were never officially part of either AQ or ISIS. Before 2003 however, the UCDP logs only one incident, whereas the GTD contains only 8 Taliban attacks. This is most likely due to the relatively quiet period following the Taliban's defeat: immediately after their 2001 capitulation it underwent an internal reorganization and launched its first insurgency against the Afghan government in 2003. We thus conduct our analysis of the Afghan-Pakistan cluster within the Jan 1, 2003 -Dec 31, 2017 time interval. Here, the GTD lists 9406 Taliban attacks and 394 ISIS attacks between 2003-2017; the UCDP lists 21030 instances of anti-terrorist intervention. Data for Syria is not available, as the UCDP only recently began translating its polygon dyad system into geographic coordinates; data for Nigeria is not sufficient for a meaningful analysis. Due to the volatile and complex civil war in Yemen, there are severe ambiguities in identifying the legitimate government. Our finding of enhanced near-reaction activity between government and terrorist activity, with long term deviations from the REH in all clusters for which data was available, suggests that state-sponsored military actions may yield increased levels of violence, at least in their immediate aftermath. Although we consider domestic state actors as compiled by the UCDP (the Iraqi, Somali and Afghan governments) our findings are consistent with a recent study on foreign military intervention conducted in 122 countries between 1970 and 2015 where foreign counterterrorism action was similarly associated to a short-term increase in terror incidents (19) . 
Pre-2014 data
In Fig. 3(a) of the main text, we show how attacks are distributed between AQ and ISIS in each cluster during the time period 2001-2017. Figs. S10(a) and (b) compare these percentages before and after the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift. Since ISIS was largely confined to Iraq and Syria at the time, the pre-2014 attacks in all other clusters are almost exclusively due to AQ as shown in Fig. S10(a) , except for a very small fraction (1%) in the Algeria/E.U. cluster. In Iraq, 95% of pre-2014 attacks were perpetrated by ISIS and its various predecessors as part of AQ's global network, 3% were by the ISIS predecessor JTJ, which was never officially an AQ affiliate, and 2% by other small AQ cells in the region. In Syria, 60% of attacks were perpetrated by AQ-affiliated JN; ISIS as an affiliate of AQ was responsible for 38% of attacks, mostly occurring during 2013 when it began expanding into Syria. The remaining 2% were earlier 2002 attacks in Jordan by JTJ. After the AQ/ISIS 2014 rift ISIS overtook AQ as the most attack-prolific terrorist group in most clusters, including Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, Libya, Afghan-Pakistan, Algeria/E.U., the Philippines, and Bangladesh, as shown in Fig. S10(b) . Post-2014 AQ maintained its dominance only in Somalia, Yemen, and Mali. Figs. S11(a) and (b) show the pre-2014 near-repeat and near-reaction latent time distributions for AQ, ISIS, and L class attacks separated by less than 20km in the Iraq, Somalia, and Syria clusters. The others do not contain sufficient pre-2014 data for a significant analysis. For example, the Yemen and Algeria/E.U. clusters display numerous attacks that were sparsely distributed over large areas, leading to few near-repeat/reaction pairs of events. In contrast, the pre-2014 attacks in Syria mostly concentrated within two years (2012-2013) over the relatively smaller area of northern and eastern Syria. Fig. S11(a) shows that the minor classes, defined as those with fewer number of combatants, exhibit more prominent near-repeat tendencies than major ones, in agreement with results shown in Fig. 4 of the main text. Fig. S11(b) reveals asymmetric near-reaction patterns for rival groups so that local militias/insurgent groups from the L class respond promptly to AQ/ISIS attacks, whereas the latter show delayed reactions. This is also consistent with results shown in Fig. 5 in the main text. In pre-2014 Iraq, 95% of AQ/ISIS attacks were attributed to both since ISIS was considered an AQ affiliate from 2004 to 2014. As a result, the AQ→AQ and ISIS→ISIS near-repeat patterns in Fig. S11(a) are almost identical, with KLD = 0.023 and 0.020 respectively. AQ and ISIS also both show slightly elevated near-repeat likelihood within the first eight weeks of an initial attack compared to the REH; in contrast, the L class shows a much higher near-repeat probability within the first eight weeks after an initial attack, if compared to both AQ and ISIS, with KLD = 0.18. Most L class attacks in pre-2014 Iraq were attributed to small groups that executed less than five attacks, in addition to non-specific perpetrators, such as Sunni/Shia/Muslim extremists, pro-government/Baathist extremists, tribesmen, and separatists. The numerous small terrorist groups most likely reflect the changing sociopolitical Iraqi scenario, as the initial insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition became an insurgency against the Shia Muslim-led Iraqi government. The large number of non-specific perpetrators may be due to limited coverage from the Western press, and possibly because the turbulent and rapidly changing terrorism landscape was largely unstructured or unknown to the outside world during this period. A case in point is the especially volatile year 2006. L class groups associated with more than 10 attacks pre-2014 include known ISIS allies such as Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna, as well as ISIS opponents, such as PKK, the Peace Companies (also known as the Mahdi Army), and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq. The great number of small groups and non-specific perpetrators raises uncertainties as to whether the pre-2014 L class in Iraq acted as an ally or an opponent of ISIS, or even as to whether it can be considered a unique block. The general understanding however is that local insurgents mainly expressed anti-ISIS sentiment, as ISIS's ideological intolerance often exacerbated sectarian conflicts. ISIS experienced hostility even within its own Sunni-Muslim community, as exemplified by the Anbar Awakening movement between 2005 and 2008, when local Sunni militias and tribes rose against ISIS in northern Iraq. This conjecture is corroborated by the asymmetric near-reaction patterns between ISIS and local L class groups in Fig. S11(b) , with a moderately significant negative correlation r = −0.54. This implies that L class groups responded promptly to ISIS attacks, whereas ISIS delayed its reactions after L class attacks, which is consistent with the post-2014 analysis given in the main text. Since 95% of AQ and ISIS attacks overlapped in pre-2014 Iraq, the AQ versus L near-reaction plots are essentially identical to the ISIS versus L ones and thus not shown. Similarly, AQ→ISIS and ISIS→AQ near-reaction patterns are essentially the same as AQ→AQ and ISIS→ISIS near-repeat patterns and are also omitted. The Somalia cluster is dominated by al-Shabaab, which was officially recognized as an AQ affiliate in 2012, whereas ISIS is not present in this region. The AQ→AQ and L→L panels shown Fig. S11(a) both refer to near-repeat patterns of al-Shabaab, but at different times. Before 2012, as an independent group al-Shabaab exhibits elevated near-repeat likelihood over a period of 12 weeks after a first attack, as shown in the L→L panel for Somalia in Fig. S11(a) . This is longer than the eight-week period shown in the AQ→AQ panel in the same figure which contains al-Shabaab 2012-2014 data. Over the first eight weeks, the near-repeat probability is also slightly higher before 2012 (L→L) than after 2012 (AQ→AQ). Since the AQ and the L classes here do not overlap in time, there is no near-reaction between AQ and L.
In Syria, the majority of pre-2014 attacks took place between 2012-2013 during the Syrian Civil War. ISIS invaded Syria in April 2013, but there is not enough data to study ISIS→ ISIS near-repeat patterns. Indeed, during most of the pre-2014 era, fighters from ISIS or its precursors joined AQ-affiliated JN in opposition to other anti-government rebels, so that in Syria AQ is the major class, followed by the local L class and no significant ISIS presence is found. While both AQ-affiliate JN and L class rebels exhibit heightened near-repeat probability over the first four weeks, as shown in Fig. S11(a) , the near-repeat probability is especially large during the first two weeks for the L class, leading to a KLD value of 0.13, larger than that of AQ-affiliated JN, which is 0.055. The pre-2014 L class in Syria consists of the same anti-government rebels as in the post-2014 L class discussed in the main text, including the Free Syrian Army, the PKK, and the Islamic Front. However, the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift changed the relation between AQ and these L class groups. AQ came to Syria through its affiliate JN in 2012 which emerged as an opponent to most of the local rebels. This is reflected in the asymmetric near-reaction AQ→L and L→AQ patterns shown in Fig. S11(b) marked by a weak negative correlation r = −0.2. The moderate negative correlation value may stem from tentative alliances between AQ and local militia groups after the ISIS invasion of Syria in April 2013 which lead to more symmetric behavior. Nonetheless, the overall weakly asymmetric near-reaction pattern confirms that the response from the local L class groups is enhanced when AQ strikes first, whereas reactions from the transnational AQ class are delayed, consistent with findings presented in the main text for post-2014 data. Finally, as discussed in the main text, AQ and local L class antigovernment rebels became allies against ISIS in post-2014 Syria, leading to symmetric near-reaction AQ→L and L→AQ patterns, marked by a positive correlation coefficient r = 0.61 as shown in Fig. 5 of the main text.
